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Abstract 
Tax reform provides many examples of failures - where reforms did not achieve their 
objectives successfully and sometimes even had to be reversed. However, value added 
tax (VAT) in the UK and goods and services tax (GST) in New Zealand have survived 
successfully for many years. This paper describes the nature and brief history of VAT 
and GST and then assesses the factors that contributed to their success. A key factor is 
the process of implementation both in allowing effective prior consultation to identify 
possible problems and improvements as well as preparing the taxpaying public for 
change. It is also important that the reform was seen to be fair, that there were gains as 
well as losses and the change was a net improvement. In assessing how the arguments 
for the introduction of VAT/GST turned out in practice, it is clear that this is a robust 
form  of  taxation  and  has  been  well  able  to  accommodate  the  different  political 
pressures in the UK and New Zealand. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the introduction to his Philosophy of History, Hegel (1837) suggested that the only 
thing we learn from history is that we never learn from history. This seems to be as 
true for tax reform as anything else and, furthermore, achieving successful tax reform 
is not a simple or easy process. Quite often a particular solution is proposed to deal 
with a particular problem without a full appreciation of the wider context in which the 
tax system is operated and the other aims and objectives of government policy (see, 
for example, James and Edwards, 2007). Indeed it is easily possible for a particular 
reform to have visible benefits in one area but for these to be outweighed by costs in 
other areas that are not fully recognised before the reform is introduced (James and 
Edwards, 2008). The Mirrlees Review (forthcoming 2009) sets out factors that make a 
good tax system and how the UK tax system could be moved in that direction. With 
admirable succinctness for such a complex topic, Bird and Oldman (1990, p. 3), have 
suggested that the best approach to tax reform is one that takes: 
into  account  taxation  theory,  empirical  evidence,  and  political  and  administrative 
realities and blends them with a good dose of local knowledge and a sound appraisal 
of the current macroeconomic and international situation to produce a feasible set of 
proposals  sufficiently  attractive  to  be  implemented  and  sufficiently  robust  to 
withstand changing times, within reason, and still produce beneficial results. 
There are many important examples of tax reforms that failed to survive at all – for 
instance  in  the  UK  selective  employment  tax  (SET),  capital  transfer  tax  and  the 
community charge, better known as the poll tax. Interestingly both capital transfer tax 
and the community charge were replaced by arrangements that had strong similarities 
with the arrangements that preceded their introduction. However SET and purchase 
tax (PT) were replaced with value added tax (VAT) that has survived, indeed even 
thrived in fiscal terms. The introduction of both VAT in the UK in 1973 and its 
equivalent  GST  in  New  Zealand  (NZ)  in  1986  are  consistent  with  the  approach 
described by Bird and Oldman by meeting the range of criteria for successful tax 
reform. Indeed, such taxes have now been successfully introduced by many countries 
including members of the European Union and all but one of the OECD countries. It 
is therefore worth reflecting on the experience of the introduction of VAT in the UK 
and the GST in NZ in order to identify key factors in these successful tax reforms. 
 
Earlier reviews of VAT in the UK have been undertaken by Prest (1980) and James 
(2000).  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  assess  the  introduction  and  subsequent Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services. Volume 8 Number 1 
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experience of VAT and GST as possible examples of successful tax reform. The paper 
therefore reflects on the original process, arguments and legislative differences for the 
introduction of VAT in the UK and GST in NZ and examines how they have been 
applied and justified by subsequent events. Section 2 briefly considers the nature and 
history of VAT and GST. Section 3 examines the process of introducing VAT and 
GST. Section 4 assesses how far the original arguments for their introduction were 
actually  realised.  Section  5  briefly  turns  to  the  experience  of  implementation 
elsewhere and, finally, section 6 draws some conclusions. 
 
2. VAT and GST 
VAT/GST has similarities with other forms of taxation. For example a VAT that 
exempts capital expenditure and money spent on inputs is in some ways equivalent to 
an income tax that exempts savings. There is also a correspondence between such a 
VAT  and  an  expenditure  tax  (see  for  example  Prest  and  Barr,  1985)  where  an 
expenditure tax is a tax on personal incomes after deducting savings and specifically 
taxes spending from savings. The Meade Committee (1978) therefore saw VAT as a 
possible way of achieving an expenditure tax. However, in general most forms of 
VAT/GST exempt capital inputs and are therefore basically taxes on consumption 
rather than income. 
 
As its name suggests, the tax is levied on the value added at each stage of production 
and is therefore payable when goods or services are supplied to another business or to 
the final consumer. Products can be treated favourably either by zero-rating or by 
exemption. Zero rated goods are in principle subject to VAT but the rate is zero. This 
means firms do not have to charge their customers VAT but can reclaim the tax paid 
on their inputs so the final output is completely free of the tax. Exemption is less 
advantageous  because  exempt  goods  and  services  are  outside  the  VAT  system 
altogether so that although firms do not have to charge their customers VAT they 
cannot reclaim tax paid on their inputs. 
 
VAT was originally introduced in the UK in 1973 at a standard rate of 10%. In 1974 
this was reduced to 8% but VAT was levied at an additional ‘luxury rate’ on a range 
of items at a rate of 25% from 1975. The wide disparity between the two rates and the 
range of anomalies in the relative taxation of items falling in different categories led 
to the 25% rate being reduced to 12.5% in 1976. However the administration of the 
two rates remained difficult and further revenue was required to permit reductions in 
the rates of income tax. In 1979 therefore these two rates of VAT were amalgamated 
at 15%. Much later, following the abolition of the Community Charge a substantial 
slice of local government taxation was also replaced by a further increase in the rate of 
VAT to 17.5% in 1991. In December 2008 the rate was temporarily reduced to 15% 
until  January  2010  in  order  to  stimulate  spending  in  the  face  of  an  economic 
downturn. In NZ GST was introduced in 1986 at a rate of 10% and in 1988 the rate 
was raised to 12.5% where it has remained. 
 
3. The Process of Introducing VAT and GST 
Bird and Oldman point out that successful tax reform requires ‘ a feasible set of 
proposals  sufficiently  attractive  to  be  implemented’  and  here  the  process  of 
introduction can be very important both in allowing effective prior consultation to Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services. Volume 8 Number 1 
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identify possible problems and improvements and to prepare the taxpaying public for 
the change. There were wide ranging discussions in both the UK and NZ though there 
were  different  emphases  reflecting  their  different  circumstances  and  the  extent  of 
experience of such taxes at the time of implementation. In the UK, the Government 
announced  its  intention  to  introduce  a  VAT  some  two  years  before  it  was  to  be 
operational.  A Green Paper (1971) was published setting out details of the proposals 
so that consultation could take place with those who might be affected by the new tax. 
That process of consultation continued for a 12 month period and attracted a large 
number  and  variety  of  submissions.  This  consultation  resulted  in  a  White  Paper 
(1972) which set out the structure of the tax, draft clauses and schedules for further 
discussion. 
 
It is possible that NZ did not need quite as long a consultation period as the UK as it 
was well placed to benefit from the earlier experience of other countries and the NZ 
Treasury had already looked at a value added tax for NZ in 1982. Nevertheless it is 
also possible that extensive consultation may perhaps lead to too many compromises 
with special interests. Green (2007, p. 24), the expert in tax law on the NZ Advisory 
Panel, compared the time limits within which the changes were made: 
The final result in the United Kingdom is a VAT that because of, among other things, 
exemptions and different rates, is much more complex than the New Zealand GST. 
The original proposal in the United Kingdom was also for a simple tax. The original 
aim was not achieved in that country to the same extent that it was in New Zealand. 
Perhaps the short period for refinement assisted that result! 
 
The tight response times did not allow for long periods of analysis and contemplation 
which could have lead to more disputes or vexatious submissions. There was little 
time  for  those  in  opposition  to  the  new  tax  regime  to  mount  detailed,  concerted 
campaigns which may have engendered concerns within the public. 
 
In NZ there was also a different emphasis on the nature of the consultative process 
which  was  aimed  at  improving  the  quality  of  the  product  (GST)  that  was  being 
introduced. ‘It was a consultative process – “how do we make it better?” – rather than 
a consensus building exercise – “how can we buy your opposition off?” ’ (Douglas, 
2007, p. 8). In 1984 when GST was first mooted in NZ, as the former Minister of 
Finance Roger Douglas (2007, p. 4) has since stated, ‘…we were faced not only with a 
number of serious economic problems but a tax system that was a mess, created by 
decades of ad hoc decisions and bad political compromises.’ 
 
The aim of the consultation was to improve the quality of the tax package that was 
being applied (including the GST laws) on the basis of sound principles of a good 
taxation system – as discussed, for example by Alley and Bentley (2005). It also set 
out  to  explain  expected  and  possible  difficulties  and  how  these  could be tackled. 
There was a genuine aim to find and solve problems, to explain difficult concepts and 
to inform all parties. There was a commitment to creating a bond of understanding: to 
treating the public as responsible citizens, giving them the facts on which to make 
informed decisions. The tax was accompanied with associated reforms which gave the 
total package a neutral impact on those that would be paying the GST. The perceived 
fairness was proved by clear examples. The total tax package gained credibility by Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services. Volume 8 Number 1 
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explaining the need to move the tax system away from the heavy dependence of direct 
taxes such as income tax to a more balanced use of indirect taxes such as GST. 
 
A White Paper outlining the proposals for the administration of GST was published in 
March 1985. The paper provided a simple technical description of the way the tax was 
to be applied and the tasks which would be required for business and self-employed 
people. Submissions were allowed until May 17. An Advisory Panel (also called a 
consultative  committee  by  Roger  Douglas)  was  formed  of  a  past  Reserve  Bank 
Governor who had stood against the Labour Party in the 1984 election, an expert in 
tax law and a well respected retailer. This Advisory Panel was to report back to the 
Minister of Finance by 31 May 1985. This First Report was presented on 4 June 1985. 
In  three  weeks  the  Panel  analysed  1,067  written  submissions  and  in  writing their 
report helped create a bond of understanding between business and government. A 
second  paper  envisaged  in  the  White  Paper  was  published  6  June  1985  with 
submissions due by 27 June. In fact submissions allowed on the White Paper beyond 
17 May 1985 were covered in this second paper. The Advisory Panel’s Second Report 
was issued in July 1985. Although the original proposal was to introduce GST on 1 
April 1986 this was deferred until 1 October 1986. The GST Co-ordinating Office 
opened in June 1985 and closed 18 months later in December 1986. The task of this 
office was to develop and implement the public education and information program 
and to coordinate the overall introduction. 
 
It is interesting to note how GST was named in NZ: 
The IRD [NZ Inland Revenue Department] wanted to call it value added tax but the 
Treasury  strongly  opposed  that.  This  was  because  we  wanted  to  make  a  clear 
distinction from the British VAT that had received a lot of adverse publicity in New 
Zealand over the years (Dickson, 2007, p. 50). 
 
A further important characteristic of successful tax reform is that there are gains as 
well as losses. In the UK the VAT replaced PT and the much criticised SET. In NZ 
the  GST  Act  came  into  force  on  1  October  1986  at  a  rate  of  10%  along  with  a 
reduction in the top personal income tax rate to 48%, an increase in personal rebates, 
the  introduction  of  the  Family  Support  Tax  Credit  for  low-income  workers  and 
beneficiaries  and  a  5%  increase  in  benefit  levels.  It  allowed  the  abolition  of  an 
antiquated Wholesale Sales Tax. This tax had imposed a dozen different specific and 
seven  ad  valorem  rates  from  10%-60%  on  an  arbitrary  selected  one-third of total 
personal consumption. It distorted both production and consumption, virtually ruining 
for example the boat-building and caravan industries (Douglas, 2007, p. 6). In 1988, 
following the share market crash in 1987, the GST rate was raised to 12.5% eight 
months after a reduction in the top personal income tax rate to 33%. No compensation 
was  given  in  higher  income  tax  rebates  or  Family  Support  Tax  Credits.  In  the 
following  months,  the  Minister  of  Finance  was  sacked  and  the  Prime  Minister 
resigned (Douglas, 2007, p. 6). 
 
4. Assessing the Reasons for the Introduction of VAT and GST 
An important feature of tax reform identified by Bird and Oldman above was that a 
tax reform would have to be ‘sufficiently robust to withstand changing times’ and 
VAT and GST have proved to be so. Among other reasons this is clear from the fact Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services. Volume 8 Number 1 
  40 
that the way the taxes developed did not altogether match the original arguments for 
their introduction but they were still able to continue successfully. 
 
Although many reasons were put forward for introducing VAT in the UK (James, 
2000) the main ones consisted of a desire for a tax: 
•  that was broadly based; 
•  on consumption (an indirect tax); 
•  that promoted tax harmonisation in Europe; 
•  that made a contribution to balance of payments policy and 
•  that was self-enforcing. 
 
In NZ in 1984 there was general consensus within the Government (Douglas, 2007, p. 
4) that: 
•  a switch from direct taxes to more indirect taxes was necessary; 
•  any package would need to be self-balancing; 
•  the reform package had to be seen to be fair; 
•  any new tax had to be as simple to operate as humanly possible; 
•  a  new  tax  needed  to  be  broad-based  so  that  the  rate  could  be  as  low  as 
possible; and 
•  tax reform would see the end to the wholesale sales tax and the distortions to 
both production and consumption that it had brought about. 
 
A broadly based tax 
In the debate leading up to the introduction of VAT one of the main arguments was 
that  the  tax  should  be  broadly  based  in  order  to  reduce  the  economic  distortions 
caused by taxes being levied on some things but not on others – as analysed, for 
example, by James and Nobes (2008). Historically, indirect taxation developed as the 
taxation of goods rather than services for straightforward reasons (see, for instance, 
Webber and Wildavsky, 2006). In less developed economies goods were more easy to 
see, value and tax, than were services. Furthermore service industries in general form 
a smaller proportion of overall economic output in less developed economies than in 
more advanced economies. The anomaly that goods should be taxed but not services 
became increasingly obvious as the service sector expanded. In the UK this led to the 
introduction  in  1966  of  an  ill-fated  attempt  to  redress  the  balance.  This  was  the 
Selective Employment Tax (SET), soon dubbed the ‘Silliest Ever Tax’, by which all 
payrolls  were  taxed,  but  the  tax  was  refunded  to  manufacturing  industry  (see 
Reddaway, 1970 and 1973). 
 
However, the aim of a very broadly based VAT was not met from the beginning. To 
secure its political acceptability many concessions were made either by exempting 
items from VAT or by subjecting them to the zero-rate. As a result of the extensive 
exemptions and zero rating only just over half of consumer expenditure was covered 
by VAT (Davies and Kay, 1985) and the proportion has not increased much since its 
introduction. However this had a perceived advantage in that the effects of VAT on 
the distribution of income turned out to be less adverse than some had anticipated. 
Much of this was a result of ensuring that certain items such as food were free of tax 
whereas VAT was levied on many forms of consumption that tended to be more the 
prerogative of those on higher incomes. Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services. Volume 8 Number 1 
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In NZ there was a different emphasis. Before 1985, each tax base had been eroded by 
a series of tax exemptions, incentives and rebates. The 1984 budget estimated that 
personal  income  tax  expenditures  (that  is  tax  exemptions,  incentives  and  rebates) 
amounted to 9.1% of personal income tax revenue, with the majority of these going to 
upper income groups (Douglas, 1984). The narrowest tax base was for goods and 
services with a wholesale sales tax that excluded the service sector as well as value 
added by retailers. To quote Douglas (2007, p. 4): 
The decision to go for a quality product - by that I mean to have a value added tax 
that had virtually no exemptions - was fundamentally important. This determination 
was clearly demonstrated by the inclusion of the government sector in the tax base 
and our treatment of residential dwelling, local government and tourism. 
 
Few  goods  and  services  fall  outside  the  tax  net  and  those  that  do,  for  example 
domestic rental accommodation and financial services were made exempt for practical 
reasons (such as limiting the cost of compliance). 
 
There was much debate on the regressive nature of taxing consumption such as food 
and clothing. Although low income families consume a greater proportion of their 
income on food than do those on higher incomes, most of the benefit of exempting 
food would go to benefit the latter group. As Douglas (2007, p. 8) described the 
situation: 
Only 15% of the benefit from an exemption for food in New Zealand would have 
gone to the bottom 20% of households by income. Eighty-five percent of the benefit 
would have gone to 80% of households who where better off than those people. 
Todd  (2007,  p.  30)  of  the  GST  Co-ordinating  Office  has  stated  that  the  limited 
exemptions feature, perceived fairness of the tax and the associated reforms greatly 
simplified the task of selling the GST and were key to its successful implementation. 
The exemptions issue was perhaps the most important and the most difficult. Why 
not exempt necessities? We were well aware of the complications that arise when 
exemptions are introduced and boundaries set between taxable and exempt items. 
In the UK children’s clothing is not subject to VAT but there are complex problems in 
drafting the rules that set the boundaries. For example from a literal interpretation of 
the rules for exemption of children’s clothing in the UK: 
one could conclude that a young child’s non-humorous hat trimmed with one-sixth 
untanned  dog  skin  would  be  safely  exempt  from  the  tax.  But  a  child’s coat one 
quarter trimmed with Mongolian goat skin would undoubtedly be subject to VAT 
(Todd, 2007, p. 30). 
GST  was  introduced  into  NZ  as  a  neutral  tax  (that  is  it  was  self  balancing)  The 
revenue generated was used to abolish wholesale sales tax and adjust the income tax 
system and the welfare support system such as the family tax credits. 
 
Moving from direct to more indirect taxes 
Before the introduction of GST, NZ’s tax revenue was heavily reliant on direct tax, 
especially personal income tax which was 64% of total tax revenue. Total indirect 
taxes  including  wholesale  sales  tax  were  25%.  In  2006  personal  income  tax  had 
dropped to 43% of total tax revenue, GST was 25% and other indirect taxes 8%, 
making a total for indirect taxes of 34%. There had been an increase of over 10 points 
in company taxes (McCleod et al. 2001). 
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In more recent years there has been a trend back towards the pre-GST higher income 
tax  percentages  as  a  proportion  of  total  tax  revenue.  They  went  down  after  the 
introduction of GST but are now creeping up again. Both the corporate and personal 
(individual) tax take percentages have increased in 2007 with corporate income tax 
being 16% and personal income tax being 44% of the total tax revenue. GST revenue 
is 19% and other indirect taxes 8% of the total tax revenue (Cullen, 2007, p. 2). The 
percentage of indirect taxes to total revenue has dropped from 2006 to 2007, but this 
is most likely due to the increased total amount of income taxes taken. A reduction in 
the corporate tax rate from 33% down to 30% was signalled in the May 2007 budget, 
applying from 1 April 2008. 
 
Harmonisation 
One consideration for VAT in the UK was harmonisation with Europe. At the time of 
the discussion about the introduction of VAT, there were only six members of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and each had adopted a system of VAT. It 
was clear that they required a mutually acceptable system of indirect taxation that 
would operate without causing distortions to the trade between them. Furthermore the 
Scandinavian countries were moving in the same direction. The UK then had about 
40% of its trade with countries either already having or proposing to introduce a VAT 
so whether or not it joined the European Community the tax would be relevant to the 
UK (National Economic Development Office, 1971, p. 4). It also appeared that the 
‘general experience of the tax in the seven countries which have adopted and operated 
it for a year or more is that, after the initial teething troubles, the tax is not found to be 
unduly difficult to work in practice’ (Green Paper, 1971, p. 9). 
 
The main difficulty is that Member States of the European Union are often reluctant to 
give up control of taxation which provides not only their main source of revenue but 
is also a powerful instrument of economic and social policy. An interesting account of 
the  European  negotiations  by  Leonard  Harris  (1996,  p.  165),  as Director of VAT 
policy at Customs and Excise seems to reveal that concessions made are usually ones 
that do not affect the UK. For instance, in recording that the UK agreed to a minimum 
standard rate of VAT of 15 %, he pointed out the chances of the British Chancellor 
wanting to go below that were ‘slim’. He went on to say that the UK agreed to the 
abolition of higher rates, which the UK does not have, and accepted a limit on the 
range of goods and services which Member States can include in their reduced rate 
bands and which did not affect the UK either. On the other hand the UK protected the 
right to retain its zero-rate provisions so agreement was reached with little of any 
significance conceded at all! 
 
The balance of payments 
Although harmonisation was not a consideration in NZ, in both countries international 
competitiveness was a factor in the case for a VAT/GST.  In the period prior to the 
introduction of VAT, the UK had been concerned with its balance of payments and 
deficits had been seen as a real problem. One of the arguments for change was that it 
would ‘benefit the balance of payments, since VAT can more fully be remitted on 
exports’ (Green Paper, 1971, p. 5). Some parts of the existing PT were an indirect 
burden on exports and SET was often wholly unrelieved on exports. 
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The position was similar in NZ. Around the time of enactment of GST and, indeed, 
subsequently there has been world wide disapproval of tariffs, trade barriers and direct 
subsidy of exports. However zero rating of exports of goods and services was an 
acceptable  method  of  achieving  the  same  purpose  -  zero  rating  being  the  only 
complete  liberation  from  GST.  Nevertheless  such  arguments  perhaps  became  less 
convincing since the introduction of VAT/GST.  Such taxes certainly reduce the tax 
burden on exports. However, in the UK since the introduction of VAT the value of the 
pound has normally been left to markets to determine and the balance of payments has 
not been the policy concern it was under a system of fixed exchange rates. More 
generally the advantage of having such a tax in this respect has diminished since such 
taxes have been introduced by more and more countries. 
 
Arguments used against the introduction of VAT and GST 
There were two main arguments used against the introduction of a VAT. One was its 
possible effect on prices and wages which were a sensitive issue at the time. Second it 
was anticipated that the administrative and compliance costs would be considerably 
higher than the costs for PT and SET. 
 
The experience of VAT currently is that the prices and wages issue does not have the 
significance it once had. This is partly understandable since the impact of a new tax is 
likely to be very different from one that has been established for over three and a half 
decades.  Furthermore,  there  has  been  a  shift  in  the  prevailing  view  regarding 
economic policy on these matters. In the period up to the introduction of VAT it was 
commonly  thought  that  government  could  and  should  influence  such  variables  as 
prices and incomes but the failures of such policies contributed to a more market-
based philosophy and a much lighter hand of government in these respects. 
 
There was considerable debate over the inflationary impact of GST. Nana and Philpott 
(1985) estimated a price effect of the change from WST to GST to be 7%. Wells and 
Fraser (1986) used an inter-industry model to calculate a static effect of the change at 
6.6%. The post GST price increase fell between these estimates, with the CPI increase 
being 3% in the September 1886 quarter and 8.9% in the December 1986 quarter, 
falling to 2.4% in the March 1987 quarter. 
 
The second argument - the higher administrative and compliance costs proved to be 
correct but in the longer run these costs did not turn out to be as high as some had 
predicted. Replacing PT and SET with VAT  in the UK led to an increase in the 
number  of  taxpayers  from  74,000  to  1.4  million  and  an  increase  in  the  number 
involved with the administration of these taxes from 2,000 to 12,500 (Kay and King, 
1990, p. 129). In order to estimate the compliance costs of VAT, an extensive study 
was undertaken at the University of Bath by Sandford et al. (1981) looking at such 
costs five years after the introduction of VAT. As is well known, producing accurate 
estimates of such costs is very difficult. For instance, in the Bath study only 2,857 of 
the  9,094  questionnaires  despatched  were  returned.  The  bias  was  towards  larger 
businesses  and  it  cannot  be  known  exactly  how  far  those  who  completed  the 
questionnaires were able or willing to provide a full and accurate picture of such costs 
to  their  firms.  On  the  basis  of  their  investigation,  Sandford  and  his  colleagues 
estimated that the total compliance costs of VAT as a percentage of revenue collected 
was of the order of 10%. It is also known that the compliance costs for the smallest Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services. Volume 8 Number 1 
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registered firms are very high. In a report on VAT compliance, the National Audit 
Office (1994) found costs that were the equivalent of about 20% of the tax paid. 
 
However, since the information was collected for the initial Bath study, the standard 
rate of VAT was nearly doubled with the obvious result that compliance costs as a 
percentage  of  revenue  collected  fell  substantially.  It  is  also  likely  to  have  fallen 
significantly further since then and Sandford et al. (1989, p. 135) later estimated that, 
for  1986/87,  compliance  costs  were  approximately  3.7%  of  VAT  revenue.  They 
suggested that significant falls in compliance costs were the result of the abolition of 
the  higher  rate  of  VAT,  the  learning  effect  of  taxpayers  gaining  expertise  in 
compliance and a series of simplification measures. 
 
A uniform rate, few exemptions and zero rating helped hold down compliance costs 
for business and administration cost for the Government in NZ. GST was less costly 
for the Government to collect than income tax but perhaps part of this was due to the 
initial  collection  and  payment  of  the  tax  being  made  by  business.  The  cost  of 
compliance was also mitigated by a registration threshold of $24,000 (now $40,000). 
Small firms had the option of accounting for GST on a two monthly or six monthly 
basis or annually with provisional tax payments. No invoices were required for small 
purchases and a simplified GST invoice was possible for smaller amounts. The use of 
a ‘tax fraction’ to calculate GST and the use of a cash, invoice or hybrid method of 
accounting for GST were also methods of reducing the compliance costs. 
 
Sandford  and  Hasseldine  (1992)  undertook  a  study  of  compliance  costs  for  all 
business related taxes in NZ. They found compliance costs for company tax were 
19.6% of the tax revenue, fringe benefit tax 1.7%, PAYE just under 2% and GST 
7.3%. Mean compliance costs were much higher for small firms ranging from 2.6% of 
turnover for firms of less than $30,000 turnover to 0.2% for turnover between $1 to $2 
million and 0.0054% for firms with a turnover of $50 million or more. 
 
Overall experience 
In terms of the arguments originally put forward for the introduction of VAT the 
outcome has been moderately successful. Although limited, the tax was more broadly 
based without some of the problems associated with its predecessors. Furthermore the 
disadvantages have not proved as bad as some had claimed. 
 
One of the main advantages of VAT/GST is that such a tax has proved adaptable to 
the perceived needs or preferences of the host country. For instance, while NZ was 
able to introduce successfully a very broad based tax, the situation in the UK was such 
that it was not possible to gain political support for the taxation of certain items such 
as food, children’s clothes and domestic fuel and power. Even subsequent attempts 
have not been successful. For example, domestic fuel and power had been zero-rated 
when VAT was introduced in 1973. With increasing concerns about the consumption 
of fossil fuels it became subject to a rate of 8% in 1994 with the intention that it be 
should be subject to the full rate of VAT from 1995. It then became clear again that 
this was a very sensitive area politically and the second increase was abandoned. In 
fact the rate of tax on domestic fuel and power was reduced to 5% in 1997 and this 
rate has since been used frequently to favour a range of other areas – for example, 
energy saving materials for home insulation from 2000, children’s safety car seats and Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services. Volume 8 Number 1 
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women’s  sanitary  products  from  2001,  extending  the  coverage  for  energy  saving 
materials in 2005, contraceptive products from 2006 and smoking cessation products 
from 2007. Although, of course, such changes have reduced the broadness of the tax, 
they have allowed VAT to be used to support a range of government policies. 
 
5. Implementation Elsewhere 
VAT/GST has been widely adopted in recent years and such taxes are now used by 
130  countries.  After  the  introduction  of  GST  in  Australia,  the  United  States  of 
America  (USA)  remains  the  only  member  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  without  a  VAT  but  the  possibility  of 
introducing such a tax in the USA has been frequently examined, for example by 
Sullivan (1965), Lindholm (1980) and Graetz (2007). The more general European 
experience has also been assessed from a viewpoint of the USA (see, for example, 
Aaron, 1981). Burchell et al. (1985) may give some clues as to why the UK and NZ 
have such a tax and the USA does not. Apart from the USA however, the widespread 
adoption of a VAT testifies to its advantages. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The experiences of VAT in the UK and GST in NZ have clearly indicated that such 
taxes meet the complex requirements for successful tax reform described by Bird and 
Oldman. Many of the hopes and fears expressed before the introduction of VAT in the 
UK did not turn out to be so important in practice but it was essential that the tax met 
the  sometimes  difficult  requirements  of  political  acceptability.  VAT  was  not  as 
broadly based as its supporters had hoped. Its contribution to tax harmonisation and 
the balance of payments was not as great as some had thought. On the other hand the 
disadvantages  that  had  been  asserted  regarding  VAT  were  not  as  serious  as  its 
opponents had argued. Thirty-five years on, VAT has proved to be a useful and robust 
tax and is one of the biggest sources of tax revenue in the UK. There is little doubt 
that it has become an established part of the fiscal furniture. 
 
In NZ the experienced has been summarised as follows: 
The success of the GST can be traced to five key process elements; political will, the 
right people, the way in which the proposal was packaged, an effective consultative 
process, and an effective communication process (Douglas (2007, p. 3). 
Its  success  has  also  been  well  demonstrated  and  can  perhaps  be  gauged  by  the 
comments of tax experts who were not involved in its introduction and by the esteem 
in which it is held by other countries. For example, Cnossen one of the world's leading 
experts on GST/VAT, had this advice for the USA: 
If the United States were to give thought to adopting a VAT, it should be advised, 
however,  to  avoid  the  mistakes  of  the  European  VATs  with  their  multiple  rates, 
open-ended exemptions for health, education, and governments, and ill-considered 
treatment of agriculture, commercial real estate, and nonprofit organisations. Rather, 
the United States should look towards the New Zealand VAT, whose tax base more 
closely resembles the base proposed under the NRST [National Retail Sales Tax] 
plans. All goods and services, with the fewest possible exceptions, should be taxed at 
a single rate (only exports should be zero-rated). Tax burden distribution concerns 
could be addressed through targeted demogrants. (Cnossen, 2002, pp. 243-4). 
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However in both countries the introduction of VAT/GST can be considered a success, 
in  contrast  to  the  examples  given  above  -  of  SET,  capital  transfer  tax  and  the 
community charge. In considering the introduction of future taxes there is much to 
learn from the successful introduction of VAT/GST in the UK and NZ, in particular in 
the  process  of  implementation,  the  need  to  appear  fair  and  to adopt a tax that is 
sufficiently robust to accommodate differing political pressures. 
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